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Problem gamblingThe present study explored the relationship between metacognitions, attentional control, and the severity
of gambling in problem gamblers. One hundred and twenty six problem gamblers completed the Depression
Anxiety Stress Scales 21, the Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire 30, the Attentional Control Scale, and the Problem
Gambling Severity Index. Results revealed that negative affect, four out of ﬁve metacognitions factors (positive
beliefs about worry, negative beliefs about thoughts concerning danger and uncontrollability, cognitive
conﬁdence and beliefs about the need to control thoughts), and all attentional control factors (focusing, shifting
and ﬂexible control of thought) were correlated, in the predicted directions, with the severity of gambling. The
same metacognitions were also found to be correlated, in the predicted directions, with attention focusing,
however only negative beliefs about thoughts concerning danger and uncontrollability and cognitive conﬁdence
were found to be correlated with attention shifting and ﬂexible control of thought. A hierarchical regression
analysis showed that beliefs about the need to control thoughts were the only predictor of the severity of
gambling controlling for negative affect. Overall these ﬁndings support the hypotheses and are consistent with
the metacognitive model of psychological dysfunction. The implications of these ﬁndings are discussed.
© 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).1. Introduction
Problem gambling has far reaching effects on numerous areas of an
individual's life, including health, relationships with family and friends,
and ﬁnancial stability. Problem gambling has also been associated
with alcoholism and drug use, depression and suicidal tendencies, and
criminal behaviour (Morasco et al., 2006; Petry, Stinson, & Grant, 2005).
Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) has been used as theﬁrst line of
treatment for problem gambling with a primary focus upon the
restructuring of the content of thinking, such as tackling irrational
beliefs and attitudes relating to gambling, which have been shown to
be central in the development and maintenance of gambling problems
(Gaboury & Ladouceur, 1989; Sharpe, 2002; Toneatto, 1999). There
is evidence supporting CBT for problem gambling (Toneatto, 2005;
Toneatto & Millar, 2004), however improvements appear to only
occur in the short-term with relapse rates remaining high (Cowlishaw
et al., 2012; Toneatto, Vettese, & Nguyen, 2007).
A fundamental limitation of CBT is its almost exclusive focus
on targeting the content of thoughts at the detriment of not fully
addressing other crucial components of cognition involved in themain-
tenance of psychological dysfunction. As Wells and Matthews (1996)
state “cognitive theories of emotional disorder tend to consider only. This is an open access article underlimited elements of cognition, and they often neglect broader aspects
such as attention, regulation of cognition, levels of control of processing,
and interactions between varieties of processing” (p.881).
Twenty years agoWells andMatthews (1994) put forward the Self--
Regulatory Executive Function (S-REF) model with the speciﬁc aim of
addressing howmultiple levels of cognition (i.e. metacognition) are in-
volved in the development and maintenance of psychological
dysfunction. Over the last two decades the S-REF model has led to the
development of disorder-speciﬁc formulations and treatments for a
wide array of psychological disorders and a psychological treatment,
metacognitive therapy (MCT), which has been evaluated across a series
of studies with preliminary results indicating superior outcomes to CBT
(Normann, van Emmerik, & Nexhmedin, 2014; Wells, 2009, 2013).
In the S-REF model, Wells and Matthews (1994, 1996) argue that
psychological dysfunction is associated with a style of thinking termed
the Cognitive Attentional Syndrome (CAS)which consists of heightened
self-focused attention, recyclical thinking patterns (rumination and
worry), avoidance and thought suppression, and threat monitoring.
The activation and persistence of the CAS in response to stress are de-
pendent onmaladaptivemetacognitions.Metacognitions refer to the in-
formation individuals hold about their own cognition and internal
states, and about coping strategies that impact on both (Wells, 2000;
Wells & Matthews, 1994, 1996). Examples of information individuals
hold about their own cognition may include beliefs concerning the sig-
niﬁcance of particular types of thoughts, e.g. “It is bad to think X” or “Ithe CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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about coping strategies that impact on cognition may include beliefs
such as “Worrying will help me get things sorted out in my mind” or
“Ruminating will help me solve the problem”.
2. Metacognitions in gambling
Metacognitions have been found to predict psychopathology gener-
ally (for a review see Wells, 2009, 2013) and also play a role in the
severity of clinical presentations across addictive behaviours, including
alcohol (Hoyer, Hacker, & Lindenmeyer, 2007; Spada & Wells, 2005,
2006, 2008, 2009, 2010; Spada, Caselli, & Wells, 2013; Spada, Moneta,
& Wells, 2007; Spada, Zandvoort, & Wells, 2007), Internet (Spada,
Langston, Nikčević, & Moneta, 2008; Spada, Mohiyeddini, & Wells,
2008) and nicotine (Nikčević & Spada, 2008, 2010; Spada et al., 2007;
Spada, Nikčević, Moneta, & Wells, 2007) use.
More recently, a preliminary study undertaken by Lindberg and
colleagues (Lindberg, Fernie, & Spada, 2011) in a community sample
found that metacognitions (negative beliefs about thoughts concerning
uncontrollability and danger, and beliefs about the need to control
thoughts) predicted gambling controlling for negative affect. These
metacognitions refer to beliefs that certain thoughts should not be
experienced, because of their negative content, andwill lead to negative
consequences if they are not controlled. The authors argued that the
presence of such beliefs may increase the likelihood of gambling as a
temporary means of achieving cognitive-affective regulation.
3. Attentional control and its possible role in gambling
Attentional control can be conceptualized as the ability to control
attention in inhibiting a dominant response in favour of a less accessible,
subdominant response that may be more functional (Derryberry &
Reed, 2002; Rothbart & Bates, 1998). Derryberry and Reed (2002)
have suggested three typologies of ability to voluntarily control
attention: (1) attention focusing (e.g. “When I am working hard on
something, I still get distracted by events around me”); (2) attention
shifting (e.g. “I can quickly switch from one task to another”); and
(3) ﬂexible control of thought (e.g. “It takes me a while to get really
involved in a new task’). Evidence has demonstrated that high levels
of attentional control enable the modulation of reﬂexive emotional
responses, whereas low levels of attentional control increase vulnera-
bility to acting on dysfunctional emotional responses (Derryberry &
Reed, 2002).
According to the S-REF model the activation and persistence of the
CAS under conditions of stress will result in a reduction of the cognitive
resources available to control attention, in turn inﬂuencing the efﬁciency
of processing and belief change (Wells, 2009). Moreover, it is possibleTable 1
Means, standard deviations, ranges and Spearman rho inter-correlations of variables.
X SD Range MCQ-30-PBW MCQ-30-NBT MCQ-30
1. DASS-21 9.8 7.5 0–30 0.35⁎⁎ 0.57⁎⁎ 0.20⁎
2. MCQ-30-PBW 9.6 3.9 6–24 – 0.56⁎⁎ 0.21⁎
3. MCQ-30-NBT 10.1 4.1 6–24 – – 0.26⁎⁎
4. MCQ-30-CC 10.0 4.0 6–24 – – –
5. MCQ-30-BNCT 11.0 3.9 6–24 – – –
6. MCQ-30-CS 14.3 4.9 6–24 – – –
7. ACS-F 24.0 4.5 11–35 – – –
8. ACS-S 18.3 3.6 8–28 – – –
9. ACS-FCT 11.9 2.1 7–16 – – –
Note. n = 126. DASS-21 = Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales 21; MCQ-30-PBW=Metaco
Questionnaire 30-Negative Beliefs about Thoughts; MCQ-30-CC = Metacognitions Questionn
about the Need to Control Thoughts; MCQ-30-CS = Metacognitions Questionnaire 30-Cogniti
Control Scale-Shift; ACS-FCT = Attentional Control Scale-Flexible control of thought; PGSI = P
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.that metacognitions may in part bias the overall ability to control
attention. In support of this view, Spada, Georgiou, and Wells (2010)
found that attention shifting and focusing negatively correlate with
metacognitions (negative beliefs about thoughts concerning uncontrol-
lability and danger and beliefs about the need to control thoughts).
Research has also shown the presence of attentional bias towards
gambling related stimuli in problem gamblers (for review see Hønsi,
Mentzoni, Molde, & Pallesen, 2013). This includes both initial orienting
towards gambling stimuli as well as delayed disengagement from stim-
uli (Brevers et al., 2011;Wolﬂing et al., 2011) whichmay be interpreted
as deﬁcits in attentional control.
4. Aims of the current study
To date, no study has investigated the association between
attentional control and gambling. In addition, the only study which
investigated the relationship between metacognitions and gambling
(Lindberg et al., 2011) employed a convenience sample of participants.
On the basis of the ﬁndings discussed we decided to test the following
hypotheses in a sample of problem gamblers: (1) metacognitions (neg-
ative beliefs about thoughts concerning uncontrollability and danger,
cognitive conﬁdence, and beliefs about the need to control thoughts)
will be positively correlated with severity of gambling; (2) attentional
control will be negatively correlated with severity of gambling;
(3) metacognitions will be negatively correlated with attentional
control; and (4) metacognitions and attentional control will predict
severity of gambling when controlling for negative affect. Negative
affect was included as a control variable as it has been shown to corre-
late highly with problem gambling (Petry et al., 2005).
5. Method
5.1. Participants and procedure
The sample comprised of 126 participants (111 men) who reported
being regular gamblers and scored above 8 on the Problem Gambling
Severity Index (PGSI; Wynne, 2003). Inclusion criteria were:
(1) 18 years of age or above; (2) consenting to the study; and (3) under-
standing spoken and written English. The mean age of the sample was
33.5 years (SD = 10.9) and ranged from 19 to 70 years. The mean
score on the PGSI was 10.3 (SD = 2.4) and ranged from 9 to 18. The
sample was 88.9% White, 5.6% Asian, 1.6% Black, 1.6% Chinese, 1.6%
Mixed and 0.8% from another non-speciﬁed background.
Ethics approval for the study was obtained from an institution of
higher education in the UK. A web link directing potential participants
to the study website was sent to registered members of various
gambling organizations. A total of 317 individuals took part in the-CC MCQ-30-BNT MCQ-30-CS ACS-F ACS-S ACS-FCT PGSI
0.31⁎⁎ 0.27⁎⁎ −0.38⁎⁎ −0.30⁎⁎ −0.34⁎⁎ 0.35⁎⁎
0.29⁎⁎ 0.25⁎⁎ −0.26⁎⁎ −0.13 −0.13 0.35⁎⁎
0.46⁎⁎ 0.33⁎⁎ −0.31⁎⁎ −0.27⁎⁎ −0.21⁎ 0.37⁎⁎
0.17 0.14 −0.23⁎⁎ −0.19⁎ 0.26⁎⁎ 0.18⁎
– 0.47⁎⁎ −0.37⁎⁎ −0.04 −0.17 0.42⁎⁎
– – −0.10 0.11 0.13 0.08
– – – 0.44⁎⁎ 0.32⁎⁎ −0.34⁎⁎
– – – – 0.52⁎⁎ −0.22⁎
– – – – – −0.26⁎⁎
gnitions Questionnaire 30-Positive Beliefs about Worry; MCQ-30-NBT = Metacognitions
aire 30-Cognitive Conﬁdence; MCQ-30-BNCT = Metacognitions Questionnaire 30-Beliefs
ve Self-consciousness; ACS-F = Attentional Control Scale-Focusing; ACS-S = Attentional
roblem Gambling Severity Index.
Table 2
Hierarchical multiple linear regression statistics with problem gambling severity as out-
come variable and metacognitions and attentional control as predictor variables.
95% conﬁdence
interval
Predictor R2 β t p LL UL
Step 1
DASS-21 0.45 5.60 .01 0.10 0.20
0.20⁎⁎
Step 2
DASS-21 0.23 2.20 .03 0.01 0.14
MCQ-30-PBW 0.04 0.45 .65 −0.08 0.13
MCQ-30-NBT 0.09 0.72 .48 −0.09 0.20
MCQ-30-CC 0.14 1.77 .08 −0.01 0.18
MCQ-30-BNCT 0.26 2.82 .01 0.05 0.28
0.31⁎⁎
Step 3
DASS-21 0.18 1.60 .11 −0.01 0.13
MCQ-30-PBW 0.04 0.46 .65 −0.08 0.13
MCQ-30-NBT 0.07 0.51 .61 −0.11 0.19
MCQ-30-CC 0.11 1.30 .20 −0.03 0.16
MCQ-30-BNCT 0.26 2.65 .01 0.04 0.28
AC-F −0.09 −0.92 .36 −0.15 0.06
AC-S −0.09 −0.94 .35 −0.20 0.07
AC-FCT 0.03 −0.28 .78 −0.26 0.19
0.33
Note. n = 126. DASS-21 = Depression Anxiety and Stress Scales 21; MCQ-30-PBW =
Metacognitions Questionnaire 30-Positive Beliefs about Worry; MCQ-30-NBT =
Metacognitions Questionnaire 30-Negative Beliefs about Thoughts; MCQ-30-CC =
Metacognitions Questionnaire 30-Cognitive Conﬁdence; MCQ-30-BNCT =Metacognitions
Questionnaire 30-Beliefs about the Need to Control Thoughts; ACS-F = Attentional Control
Scale-Focusing; ACS-S = Attentional Control Scale-Shift; ACS-FCT = Attentional Control
Scale-Flexible control of thought.
⁎ p b .05.
⁎⁎ p b .01.
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study with 126 selected for the ﬁnal analysis (score on the PGSI greater
than 8). The ﬁrst page of the studywebsite explained the purpose of the
study: “To investigate the relationship between negative affect, thinking
styles, and gambling”. Participants were then directed, if consenting to
participate in the study, to a second page containing basic demographic
questions and the self-report instruments. On completion participants
were asked to click on the “Submit” button. Once participants had
clicked on “Submit”, their data was forwarded to a generic postmaster
account. This ensured that participants' responses were anonymous. A
second submission from the same IP address was not allowed so as to
avoid multiple submissions from the same participant.
5.2. Self-report instruments
5.2.1. Depression Anxiety Stress Scales 21 (DASS-21; Crawford & Henry,
2003)
This self-report instrument assesses depression, anxiety and stress.
It consists of three factors assessed by twenty one items in total. The
three factors measure depression (e.g. “I felt that I had nothing to look
forward to”), anxiety (e.g. “I felt scared without any good reason”)
and stress (e.g. “I was intolerant of anything that kept me from getting
on with what I was doing”). Higher scores indicate higher levels of
depression, anxiety and stress. The DASS-21 has been reported to have
adequate psychometric properties (Crawford & Henry, 2003; Lovibond
& Lovibond, 1995).
5.2.2. Meta-Cognitions Questionnaire 30 (MCQ-30; Wells & Cartwright-
Hatton, 2004)
This self-report instrument assesses individual differences in
metacognitions, judgments and monitoring tendencies. It consists of
ﬁve factors assessed by 30 items in total. The ﬁve factors measure the
following dimensions of metacognition: (1) positive beliefs aboutworry (e.g. “worrying helps me cope”); (2) negative beliefs about
thoughts concerning uncontrollability and danger (e.g. “when I start
worrying I cannot stop”); (3) cognitive conﬁdence (e.g. “my memory
can mislead me at times”); (4) beliefs about the need to control
thoughts (e.g. “not being able to control my thoughts is a sign of weak-
ness”); and (5) cognitive self-consciousness (e.g. “I pay close attention
to the way my mind works”). Higher scores indicate higher levels of
maladaptive metacognitions. The MCQ-30 possesses good internal
consistency and convergent validity, as well as acceptable test–retest
reliability (Spada et al., 2008; Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).
5.2.3. Attentional Control Scale (ACS; Derryberry & Reed, 2002)
This self-report instrument assesses the ability to voluntarily control
attention. It consists of three factors assessed by 20 items in total. The
three factors measure attention focusing (e.g. “My concentration is
good even if there is music in the room around me”), attention shifting
(e.g. “After being distracted or interrupted, I can easily shift my atten-
tion back to what I was doing”), and ﬂexible control of thought (e.g. “I
can become interested in a new topic very quickly if I need to”). Higher
scores predict more resistance to interference in Stroop-like spatial
conﬂict tasks, greater disengagement from threat stimuli among highly
anxious people (Derryberry & Reed, 2002) and greater activation in
brain areas related to executive functioning while looking at fear-relat-
ed pictures (Mathews, Yiend, & Lawrence, 2004). The ACS possesses
good internal reliability and predictive utility (Derryberry & Reed,
2002; Judah, Grant, Mills, & Lechner, 2014).
5.2.4. Problem Gambling Severity Index based on the Canadian Problem
Gambling Index (PGSI; Wynne, 2003)
This self-report instrument assesses the severity of gambling behav-
iour. It consists of a single factor assessed by nine items in total. Items
cover problem gambling behaviour (loss of control, motivation, chasing
and borrowing) and adverse consequences of gambling (problem
recognition, personal consequences and social consequences). Higher
scores indicate higher levels of gambling severity. Scores of 0 are
taken to indicate a non-problem gambler, 1–2 a low-risk gambler, 3–7
a moderate risk gambler and 8 or above a problem gambler. The PGSI
possesses strong reliability and validity (McMillen & Wenzel, 2006;
Wynne, 2003).
6. Results
6.1. Data description
Descriptive statistics for all the study variables are presented in
Table 1. An inspection of skewness coefﬁcients and levels of signiﬁcance
onKolmogorov–Smirnov tests indicated that severalmeasureswere not
normally distributed. Spearman's rho correlations revealed that nega-
tive affect, four out of ﬁve metacognitions factors (positive beliefs
about worry, negative beliefs about thoughts concerning danger and
uncontrollability, cognitive conﬁdence, and beliefs about the need to
control thoughts) and all attentional control factors (focusing, shifting
and ﬂexible control of thought) were correlated, in the predicted
directions, with severity of gambling. These same metacognitions
were also found to be correlated, in the predicted directions, with atten-
tion focusing, however only negative beliefs about thoughts concerning
danger and uncontrollability and cognitive conﬁdencewere found to be
correlated with attention shifting and ﬂexible control of thought.
6.2. Hierarchical regression analysis
In relation to the assumptions relevant to running a hierarchical
regression analysis, no evidence of multicollinearity in the dataset was
observed (no correlations greater than r = 0.9, no Tolerance
Indexes below 0.10, and all Variance Inﬂation Factors of less than 10).
Additionally, the Durbin–Watson test suggested that the assumption
10 M.M. Spada, A. Roarty / Addictive Behaviors Reports 1 (2015) 7–11of independent errors was tenable. Histograms and normality plots
indicated that residuals were normally distributed and plots of the re-
gression-standardized residuals against the regression standardized
predicted values suggested that the assumptions of linearity and homo-
scedasticity were met.
To evaluate whether metacognitions and attentional control inde-
pendently predicted the severity of gambling, a hierarchical regression
analysis (see Table 2) was run with all variables found to be signiﬁcant
in the correlation analysis. Negative affect was entered on step 1, the
four metacognitions factors were entered on step 2, and all three atten-
tion control factors were entered on step 3. The ﬁnal equation showed
that beliefs about the need to control thoughts were the only indepen-
dent and signiﬁcant predictor of severity of gambling.7. Discussion
Overall, the results from this study support the hypotheses aswell as
previous ﬁndings by Lindberg et al. (2011) in that they show that
metacognitions (in the form of beliefs about the need to control
thoughts) predict the severity of gambling controlling for negative
affect. This ﬁnding has: (1) greater potential clinical relevance than
Lindberg et al. (2011) original study in that the sample being investigated
is entirely constituted by problem gamblers; and (2) reiterates the
crucial importance of beliefs about the need to control thoughts in
predicting problematic gambling. Why should beliefs about the need
to control thoughts be crucial in understanding problem gambling?
The argument follows that already outlined by Lindberg et al. (2011).
According to the S-REF model metacognitions are associated with the
activation of particular thinking styles and strategies of mental control
(the CAS) in response to negative thoughts and emotions. Beliefs
about the need to control thoughts refer to beliefs that if certain
negative thoughts/emotional states are experienced they may lead to
negative consequences if not controlled. In the case of problem gam-
blers such inner experiences may be related to gambling urges, low
mood or heightened anxiety. The problem gambler may thus engage
in CAS-related activity as a means of achieving control over such un-
wanted inner experiences, leading to their exacerbation and the increas-
ing likelihood on engaging in gambling as a means of retaining, albeit
temporarily, a degree of mental control. This view would be in line
with research which has shown how gambling may be driven by affec-
tive motivations, such as coping with negative internal states and
moods (e.g. Stewart, Zack, Collins, Klein, & Fragopoulos, 2008). It also
provides further support for studies which have identiﬁed speciﬁcmeta-
cognitions about the beneﬁts of gambling in helping to achieve cogni-
tive–affective regulation (Spada, Giustina, Rolandi, Fernie, & Caselli,
2014).
The ﬁndings from this study also broadly support the association
between metacognitions and attentional control, and attentional
control and severity of gambling however results suggest that beliefs
held about the capability to resist distraction and prioritize attention
(attention focusing) are subsumed by beliefs about the need to control
thoughts in predicting severity of gambling. As argued by Spada et al.
(2010) the measurement of attentional control on the ACS relates,
fundamentally, to beliefs about executive control over attention, rather
than an actual index of attention control, and can therefore be concep-
tualized as a form of metacognitive knowledge.
From a therapeutic perspective the present ﬁndings suggest that
MCT (Wells, 2009) may be helpful in tackling problem gambling and
possibly address areas not covered by CBT. MCT directly targets the
modiﬁcation of metacognitions with the aim of simultaneously intro-
ducing ﬂexible and alternative ways of relating to mental events. A
variety of strategies are used to accomplish metacognitive change,
including re-structuring exercises and the facilitation of skills that
promote the modiﬁcation and interruption of CAS conﬁgurations
(e.g. attention training and detached mindfulness).This study has several limitationswhichwill have to be addressed by
future research. Firstly social desirability, self-report biases, context ef-
fects, and poor recall may have contributed to errors in self-report mea-
surements. This is to an extent unavoidable as there are no objective or
interview measures of metacognitions however in the case of
attentional control a behavioural test (e.g. a spatial orienting task;
Derryberry & Reed, 2002) could be employed. Secondly a cross-section-
al designwas adopted and this does not allow causal inferences. Thirdly
the sample was almost exclusively of male gender and there was no
control group. Fourthly there was no possibility to verify objectively
whether the sample represented a typical problem gambler. Fifthly
there could be time-dependent risk factors that were not considered
and that may have had an effect of the aspects of metacognition identi-
ﬁed. Finally, in view of the relatively nascent phase in which both CBT
for problem gambling and MCT for addictive behaviours ﬁnd them-
selves, cautiousness is recommended when interpreting the ﬁndings
and their possible generalizability to treatment.
Prospective studies in samples suffering from higher levels of prob-
lem gambling or diagnosed with gambling disorder are needed to
examine the independent inﬂuence of attentional control on severity
of gambling. Research involving experimental manipulation of atten-
tional control to test if its enhancement results in lower levels of gam-
bling (whilst controlling for individual differences in metacognitions)
may also prove valuable. Finally, examining whether changes in both
metacognitions and attentional control occur during the process of
treatment would be of interest.Disclosures
We conﬁrm that we have not conﬂicts of interest to disclose.References
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